Abstract-Since oblivious transfer, a primitive of paramount importance in secure two-and multiparty computation, cannot be realized in an unconditionally secure way for both parties from scratch, reductions to weak information-theoretic primitives as well as between different variants of the functionality are of great interest. In this context, various monotones-quantities that cannot be increased by any protocol-are introduced and then used to derive lower bounds on the possibility and efficiency of such reductions.
Now, by Fano's lemma (cf., [3, p. 156 
])
H(K A jK B ) h() + log 2 (2 s 0 1) h() + s A and we obtain (1) . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advantage of unconditional or information-theoretic securityas compared to computational security-is that it does not depend on any assumption on an adversary's computing power or memory space, nor on the hardness of any computational problem. Its disadvantage, on the other hand, is that it cannot be realized from scratch. This is why reductions are of great interest and importance in this context: Which functionality can be realized from which other? If a reduction is possible in principle, what is the best efficiency, i.e., the minimum number of instances of the initial primitive required per realization of the target functionality?
A task of particular importance in secure two-party computation is oblivious transfer, which is known to be impossible to realize from scratch in an unconditionally secure way for both parties by any (classical or even quantum) protocol. On the other hand, it can be realized from noisy channels [7] , [9] , [12] , weak versions of oblivious transfer [8] , [3] , [4] , [13] , [14] , [28] , or correlated pieces of information [25] , [21] .
For the same reason, reductions between different variants of oblivious transfer are of interest as well: chosen 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer from Rabin oblivious transfer [6] , string oblivious transfer from bit oblivious transfer [3] , 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer from 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, oblivious transfer from A to B from oblivious transfer from B to A [10] , [22] , [27] , and so forth. A number of lower bounds in the context of such reductions have been given, based on information-theoretic arguments [15] , [19] .
With respect to information-theoretic reductions between cryptographic and information-theoretic functionalities, quantities which never increase during the execution of a protocol-so-called monotones [5] -are of great importance. In key agreement, for instance, two parties A and B can start with correlated pieces of information X and Y , respectively, and try to generate a secret key S by public communication such that an adversary E, who initially knows a third random variable Z , is virtually ignorant about S. It has been shown in [23] that the intrinsic information [20] 
A. Contribution
In Section III, we define monotones as quantities that cannot be increased by any two-party computation. We explicitly give seven such monotones. In Section IV, we show how these monotones can be used to derive lower bounds on reductions between two-party primitives. In Section V, finally, we present concrete lower bounds.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We say that two random variables X and Y are equivalent, denoted by X Y , if there exists a bijective function g : X ! Y such that Y = g(X) holds with probability 1. Three random variables X, Y , and Z form a Markov chain, denoted by X $ Y $ Z, if P ZjXY = P ZjY . This means that X and Z are independent, given Y . A (noninteractive) functionality P takes as input the values x and y from the two players Alice and Bob, and returns them values u and v distributed according to a distribution P U V jXY .
A protocol is a pair of functions (f; g) that is executed between Alice and Bob as follows. Let x and y be the inputs to the players, chosen according to a fixed distribution PXY . The players choose uniformly at random r A ; r B 2 f0; 1g 3 and then repeat for i = 1; 2 . . .: If i is odd, then Alice sends a message m i = f (x; m 1 ; . . . ; m i01 ; r A ) to Bob; if i is even, Bob sends a message mi = g(y; m1; . . . ; mi01; rB) to Alice. If any m i is equal to , i.e., if one of the two players aborts the computation, then the loop is exited. Finally, Alice outputs u = f (x; m1; . . . ; mi; rA), and Bob outputs v = g(y; m1; . . . ; mi; rA).
A protocol with black-box access to a noninteractive functionality P can be defined in a similar way. Here, the players have additionally the possibility to send messages to the functionality Q, which calculates a result according to the definition of Q, and sends it back to the players.
We will mostly be looking at the semi-honest model, where both players behave honestly, but may save all the information they get during the protocol to obtain extra information about the other player's input or output. So, a dishonest Alice will output (x; m1; . . . ; mi; rA) instead of f (x; m 1 ; . . . ; m i01 ; r A ).
A protocol (f; g) that implements a functionality P is secure in the semi-honest model for Bob, if there exist a randomized function S for Alice, called the simulator, such that for every input (x; y) and for (u; v) = h 0 (x; y), the distribution of (S(u); v) is equal to the distribution of ((x; m1; . . . ; mi; rA); g(y; m1; . . . ; mi01; rB)).
A. Entropies and Information
The conditional Shannon entropy of X given Y is defined as 1 H(X j Y ) = 0 x;y PXY (x; y) log P X jY (x j y):
We will also use the notation h(p) = 0p log p 0 (1 0 p) log(1 0 p);
i.e., h(p) is the Shannon entropy of a binary random variable that takes on one value with probability p and the other with 10p. The conditional mutual information is defined as
1 All logarithms throughout this correspondence are binary.
We will need the following monotonicity inequalities:
for every function f .
The min-and max-entropies of X given Y are defined as Furthermore, we will need the following property of all these measures: For (X0; Y0; Z0) independent from (X1; Y1; Z1), and X = (X 0 ; X 1 ), Y = (Y 0 ; Y 1 ), Z = (Z 0 ; Z 1 ), we have
I(X; Y j Z) = I(X0; Y0 j Z0) + I(X1; Y1 j Z1):
B. Common Part
Roughly speaking, the common part X^Y of X and Y is the maximal element of the set of all random variables (i.e., the finest random variable) that can be generated both from X and from Y without any error. For example, if X = (X 0 ; X 1 ) 2 f0; 1g 2 and Y = (Y 0 ; Y 1 ) 2 f0; 1g 2 , and we have X0 = Y0 and Pr[X1 6 = Y1] = " > 0, then the common part of X and Y is equivalent to X 0 . The common part was first introduced in [17] ; in a cryptographic context, it was used in [25] .
Definition 1:
Let X and Y be random variables over X and Y and distributed according to PXY . Then X^Y , the common part of X and Y , is constructed in the following way.
• Consider the bipartite graph G with vertex set X [ Y, and where two vertices x 2 X and y 2 Y are connected by an edge if P XY (x; y) > 0 holds.
• •
We will be needing the following two lemmas from [25] .
Lemma 1: For all X , Y , and C for which there exist functions f X and f Y such that C = f X (X) = f Y (Y ) holds, there exists a function g with C = g(X^Y ).
Proof: Let us assume that such a function g does not exist.
Then there must exist values x 1 and x 2 with f X (x 1 ) 6 = f X (x 2 ) but fX (x1) = fX (x2). Then x1 and x2 must be in the same connected component of the graph from Definition 1, and we can find values 
C. Sufficient Statistics
Intuitively speaking, the sufficient statistics of X from Y , denoted X & Y , is the part of X that is correlated with Y . It has turned out to be a very useful concept in cryptography, where it was used in [24] , [16] , [18] , [25] . We will be needing the following lemma from [25] . 
III. MONOTONES
We will now present a general definition of a monotone for two-party computation and present several instances that satisfy our definition. A monotone is a function that takes a distribution of two random variables X and Y as input and outputs a number. In any protocol that Alice and Bob may execute, they cannot increase the value of any monotone. The monotone therefore tells us which results are impossible to achieve by a protocol, and its value should yield an upper bound on the "usefulness" or potential of the random variables X and Y . In order to define functions that are monotones we will make use of the common part and the sufficient statistics. The following lemma shows that under local data processing, i.e., creation of additional randomness, these values are invariant. It will help us to show that our functions satisfy Condition 1 of Definition 3. To show that our functions satisfy Condition 2 of Definition 3, we need the following lemma. we have P X jY =y = P X jY =y and f (x) = f (x 0 ). It follows that P XjY =y;f(X)=f (x) = P X jY =y ;f (X)=f (x ) , and, hence, h 1 (x; y) = h 1 (x 0 ; y 0 ). Therefore, there must exist a function g with h 1 = g h 2 .
• The statement follows from Lemma 1 and from the fact that both X^Y and f(X) can be calculated from both X and (Y; f(X)). Proof: We have PWXY Z = PXY P W ZjXY . The channel P W ZjXY can be simulated by a function f that gets as input (X; Y ) and the random value C that is independent of (X; Y ), and outputs (W; Z). (W X)^(Y Z) can be calculated from (X; C), as well as from (Y; C). Hence, it can also be calculated from (X^Y; C). Furthermore, X^Y can be calculated from (W X)^(Y Z). Therefore, there exists a function g, such that
Since C is independent of X and Y , it follows that It follows that P Y jX=x = P Y jX=x , and hence, h 1 (w; x) = h 1 (w 0 ; x 0 ). Therefore, there must exist a function g with h 1 = g h 2 . 
Proof: From Lemmas 7 follows that
and from X ! Y ! Z follows that
We are now ready to present our monotones for two-party computation. From Lemma 4 and monotonicity follows that all these functions satisfy Condition 1. Using Lemma 5 and monotonicity, we obtain Depending on the situation, some of these monotones give better bounds than others. If many independent instances of the underlying resource are given, then the monotones using H should be used. When the protocol makes some extraction, i.e., transforms a resource into (almost) uniform randomness (a very common goal of protocols), then the two monotones using H min might be preferable to H. The monotone using Hmax gives better bounds for simulation protocols, i.e., protocols that use random bits as a resource and have a nonuniform output. The monotone using I is much less intuitive than the others, but nevertheless yields, in some situations, a better bound than all the others. For an example of this, see Corollary 1.
IV. LOWER BOUNDS ON REDUCTIONS OF TWO-PARTY PRIMITIVES
In this section, we show how all these monotones can be used to get lower bounds on the efficiency of reductions among a variety of two-party primitives. These primitives must satisfy the following property: In the honest-but-curious model, they must be equivalent to a primitive without any inputs, i.e., distributed randomness. By "equivalent," we mean that there exist two protocols: One that generates the distributed randomness using one instance of the primitive, and the other implementing the primitive, using the distributed randomness. Both protocols must be secure in the semi-honest model. For any such primitive, and any monotone m, we will now define the m-capacity for two-party computation.
Definition 4: Let m be a monotone for two-party computation. Let P be a primitive between two players Alice and Bob. Furthermore, let P be equivalent to a primitive P 0 which does not have any inputs, and outputs random variables X and Y . Then the m-capacity of P is If there does not exist such a P 0 , then the m-capacity is undefined.
Theorem 2: Let m be a monotone for two-party computation. Let P 1 ; . . . ; P n , and P be primitives for which the m-capacity is defined. If there exists a protocol that securely implements P using P1; . . . ; Pn in the semi-honest model (where every primitives Pi is independent of the others and can only be used once), then
Proof: Let (Xi; Yi) be the distributed randomness which is equivalent to Pi, and let (X; Y ) be the output of P 0 , the primitive which is equivalent to P . Let X n = (X 1 ; . . . ; X n ) and Y n = (Y 1 ; . . . ; Y n ). Since (Xi; Yi) is independent from (Xj ; Yj), we have m(X n ; Y n ) = i m(X i ; Y i ):
Let 0 be defined as follows: It takes X n and Y n as input, transforms them into the primitives P 1 ; . . . P n , applies , and transforms P into P 0 . Let X and Y be the outputs and U and V be the entire views of A and B, respectively, after the execution of 0 . Let Ui and Vi be memory of Alice and Bob after step i of In m-out-of-n k-string oblivious transfer (OT), denoted n m -k , the sender inputs n k-bit messages out of which the receiver can choose to read m but does not obtain any further information about the messages; the sender, on the other hand, does not obtain any information on the receiver's choice. In [1] , it has been shown that 2 1 -1 is equivalent to pieces of information with a certain distribution (in other words, oblivious transfer can be precomputed and stored). This result generalizes to n m -k in a straightforward way.
Lemma 9: Let P = n m -k . Then, we have C A (P ) = (n 0 m)k; C B (P ) = log n m ; C C (P ) = mk:
We can now easily obtain lower bounds on the reducibility between different variants of oblivious transfer. The bound of Corollary 1 is an improvement on an earlier bound by Dodis and Micali [15] . For the special case M = m = 1, the obtained bounds are shown in Fig. 1 .
We can now also easily prove that OT cannot be extended, i.e., given s instances of OT, there does not exist a protocol that constructs s + 1 instances of OT. This was first proved by Beaver in [2] . This implies that it is impossible to implement OT from scratch.
Corollary 2:
There cannot exist a protocol that implements s + 1 instances of n m -k out of s instances of n m -k .
Let us now look at reductions of to noisy channels. We can easily show that a binary noisy channel is equivalent to distributed randomness: Alice sends a random bit, which is received by Bob with an error ". Later, Alice can send her bit XORed with this random bit, and Bob will get to know her bit with probability ". In the semi-honest model, (p)-is equivalent to a primitive without any input. Alice sends a random bit using (p)-that is received by Bob with probability p. Later, Alice can send her bit XORed with this random bit. Note that for some special cases, we know reductions that achieve the optimal bound of Corollaries 1 and 4, even in the malicious model [15] , [26] , [11] . For Corollary 3, however, an efficient reduction is still missing.
The bounds of this section can easily be generalized in many ways. For example, one could also consider the reduction of OT to different variants of OT, binary noisy channels, and Rabin-OTs at the same time.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented several monotones for two-party computation and have shown that they provide us with a powerful tool to derive lower bounds for reductions between functionalities in the semi-honest model. Note that such lower bounds do generally not directly imply lower bounds in the malicious model, as there are functionalities which can trivially be implemented in the malicious model, but not in the semi-honest model. However, for OT the lower bounds do also apply to the malicious model, as it can be shown that any secure implementation of OT in the malicious model is also secure in the semi-honest model.
In our work, we have only considered perfect reductions, however, it would be preferable to have lower bounds for reductions with a (small) probability of error.
